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Abstract
Introduction.This study aims to examine the deterrence factors namely tax sanctions
and social psychological factors consisting of procedural justice, trust in government
authorities and moral norms on voluntary tax compliance. In this study moral beliefs
and norms were tested as mediating variables. Method. The population in this study
was an individual taxpayer in the city of Pekanbaru. The sampling technique used was
purposive sampling. The survey was conducted by delivering questionnaires directly to
respondents, namely taxpayers. A total of 100 taxpayers participated in this study but
the data that can be processed is 99. Result.The results of the analysis with Structural
Equation Model with Warp PLS program show that procedural justice and tax sanctions
have a significant effect on trust in government authorities, but sanctions do not affect
moral norms. Trust does not affect voluntary compliance. so that trust does not mediate
the influence of justice and tax sanctions on voluntary compliance. The results of the
study show that moral norms are mediating trust in government authorities towards
voluntary compliance. Conclusion. This study is that the government can strive for
education to improve the taxpayer’smorality so that it will increase voluntary compliance.
Keywords: deterrence factors, social psychological factors, procedural justice, trust in
government authorities and moral norms on voluntary tax compliance
1. Introduction
Revenue from the taxation sector is the main pillar of revenue in the APBN that is used
to meet government expenditure needs in the context of national development. The
following graph describing the development of tax ratio of indonesia in the last five
years
The graph above shows that in 2012 to 2016 the tax ratio experienced a drastic
decline, which was only 10.3 percent, far lower than the previous year. The previous
year, in 2012 and 2013, the tax ratio be at approximately at 11.9 percent and decreased
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Figure 1: Indonesian Tax Ratio Development.
in 2014 to 11.4 percent until 2016 was at the lowest level. In 2017 the tax ratio experienced
a slight increase, but this figure is still relatively low.
According to Kogler, Muehlbacher, and Kirchler [1] tax compliance can be grouped
into two, enforced compliance and voluntary compliance. Enfirce compliance that arises
because of the allegation of coercion.While voluntary compliance that appears because
because of the awareness of the taxpayer itself. Procedural justice, trust in authority
and a norm as important factors tha in impove voluntary tax compliance [2–6]. Other
studies test impact deterrence factors such as tax penalties, tax audit, and tax rate on tax
compliance [7]. Previous research show that deterrence factors tax sanction can impove
tax compliance [8, 9].However these results contradict other studies which state that in
reality, the effectiveness of the sanctions system can reduce taxpayer compliance [10–
12]
Research of Ratmono [5] show that tax penalties as deterrence factor has not impact
on tax compliance. The inconsistency of the results becomes an interesting thing to
be re-tested by developing voluntary tax compliance research using trust in authorities
and moral norms as mediating variables. Van Dijke and Verbon [7] found that trust is
important when authorities focus on justice for increase voluntary compliance. Moral
norms are psychological-social variables that are thought to influence voluntary tax
compliance. Torgler [13] found that tax morale possessed by someone determines the
occurrence of tax compliance behavior.
Based on the explain above, this study examines the effect of detterence factor tax
sanction and social psychological factors procedural justice, trust in authoritues and
moral norms in affecting voluntary tax compliance. This study has a difference with
previous studies [14] which uses deterrence factors tax penalties and tax audits and only
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uses trust as a moderating variable, this study uses a more complex social psychology
variable which further explains the relationship between deterrence and psychology
factors social with voluntary compliance. This study also uses trust in government author-
ities andmoral norms asmediating variables. The next difference is the researchmethod
used, Ratmono and Cahyonowati [14] using an experiment, while this study uses survey
methods.
2. Literatur Review
2.1. Teori slippery slope
One of the latest theories about tax compliance is the slippery slope model from [4]. This
theory states that social psychology and deterrence variables determine the level of tax
compliance. Psychological-social variables tend to influence voluntary tax compliance
while deterrence variables tend to influence tax compliance based on fear of negative
consequences or forced tax compliance. Based on this slippery slope theory, the policy
of increasing public trust in the tax authority must be prioritized in order to increase
voluntary tax compliance
2.2. Hypothesis development
2.2.1. Effect of procedural justice on voluntary compliance
Procedural justice is the justice felt by taxpayers in the process of distributing tax rights
and obligations whether it has been carried out according to procedures or not. Empir-
ical studies show that if a person feels that the authorities carry out fair and existing
procedures, they tend to ask for authority [15] and are more in line with the decisions
taken by the tax authorities [6, 16]. From the description above, procedural justice is
thought to influence voluntary compliance. Following hypothesis is formulated:
H1: Procedural justice had a significant effect on voluntary tax compliance.
2.2.2. Effect of procedural justice on trust in authorities
Fairness Heuristic Theory explains that people will observe carefully whether the tax
authorities act procedurally fair. Several studies have revealed that when tax authorities
follow procedural justice rules, such as refraining from self-interest and voting in the
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community decision-making process, assessing such a fairer procedure will increase
taxpayers’ trust [17, 18]. Based on the description above, it is hypothesized
H2: Procedural justice had a significant effect on trust in authorities
2.2.3. Effect of trust in authorities on voluntary complience
Trust emphasizes the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities resulting from
the trust of taxpayers in the actions of tax authorities. Wahl [19] found a positive impact
derived from the strength and trust in paying taxes. The same findings are mentioned
in the study by Muehlbacher, Kirchler, and [20] and [1], where they found trust from tax
authorities to increase voluntary tax compliance. Based on the description above, it is
hypothesized:
H3: trust in authorites had a significant effect on voluntary tax compliance
2.2.4. Effect of procedural justice on moral norms
Theory of moral reasoning in the context of tax compliance states that moral decisions
are mainly influenced by the application of sanctions at a low level of moral reasoning,
expectations of fairness at a moderate level, and the issue of justice at the highest level.
Some studies [21] provide evidence that when taxpayers are treated fairly by the tax
authorities, the treatment stimulates the internalization of collective norms (the process
of personal norms). can be formulated the following hypothesis:
H4: Procedural justice had a significant effect on moral norms
2.2.5. Effect of moral norms on voluntary tax compliance
Norm activation theory [22] relavan to explain the behavior of taxpayers in fulfilling their
obligations to pay taxes. Someone will obey paying taxes on time, if someone already
feels that paying taxes is his duty. Wenzel [2] proved that personal norms negatively
affect tax avoidance which means that it can increase tax compliance. Based on this,
the following hypothesis can be formulated
H5: Moral norm had a significant effect on voluntary tax compliance
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2.2.6. Effect of tax sanctions on trust in authorities
Moral assessment of punishable behavior is a key factor in understanding the relation-
ship between tax authorities and compliance sanctions [23]. Whether tax disobedience
is seen as immoral or immoral depends on how sanctions are perceived: (1) as com-
pensatory that is to show an economic transaction, or (2) retributive shows that norm
violations deserve punishment. Based on the description above, it is hypothesized
H6: tax sanctions had a significant effect on trust in authorities
2.2.7. Effect of tax sanctions on Moral Norm
Tax sanctions are imposed on taxpayers as a legal consequence if they violate existing
regulations. The theory that is considered to be closely related to the moral of taxpay-
ers is the theory of moral reasoning. The theory of moral reasoning in the context of
tax compliance states that moral decisions are mainly influenced by the application of
sanctions on low moral reasoning.Based on the description above, it is hypothesized
H7: Tax sanctions had significant effect on moral norm
2.2.8. Trust in authoritiesmediated reslationship procedural justicewith
voluntary compliance
The Heuristic Justice Theory explains when tax authorities act according to fair proce-
dures, the taxpayer will increase taxpayer trust [17, 18]. Trust in authority has a positive
impact on the willingness to pay taxes. This is supported by [20] and [1], where they
found trust from tax authorities to increase voluntary tax compliance
H8: Trust in authorities mediated reslationship procedural justice with voluntary com-
pliance
2.2.9. Moral Norm mediated relationship procedural justice with volun-
tary compliance
Fair procedures can affect the attitude of taxpayers to behave honestly and be respon-
sible for their tax obligations. Thus a fair procedure will increase the morale of the tax-
payer. Verboon and van Dijke [7] research proves that themoral norms of taxpayers have
a positive effect on tax compliance. Wenzel [2] proves that personal norms negatively
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affect tax avoidance which means that it can increase tax compliance. Based on this, the
following hypotheses can be formulated:
H9: Moral Norms Mediated relationship procedural fairness with voluntary compliance
2.2.10. Trust in authorities mediated relationship tax sanction with vol-
untary compliance
Moral judgments about punishable behavior are key factors in understanding the rela-
tionship between imposing sanctions by tax authorities and tax compliance [23]. Retribu-
tive sanctions tend to increase trust compared to compensatory sanctions because they
show moral disagreement with norm violations [24]. Thus the amount of sanctions that
are felt to be fair will increase trust so that it will increase voluntary compliance. Based
on the description above, it is hypothesized:
H10: Trust in authorities mediated relationship tax sanction with voluntary compliance
2.2.11. Moral norms mediated relationship tax sanctions with voluntary
compliance
Theory of moral reasoning states that moral decisions aremainly influenced by the appli-
cation of sanctions at a low level of moral reasoning. Moral norms owned by taxpayers
can be intrinsic motivation for taxpayers in complying with their tax obligations without
coercion [25]. Based on the description above, it is hypothesized:
H11: Moral norms mediated relationship tax sanctions with voluntary compliance
3. Research Method
3.1. Population and sample
The population in this study is an individual tax payer who has a business registered at
Tax Office Partama Tampan which amounts to 8,832 (source: tax office Pratama Tam-
pan). The sampling technique used convenience sampling, which is sampling in the
easiest way according to the researcher. The selection of this sampling technique is
used because the population in the study is homogeneous
3.2. Measurement
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3.2.1. Voluntary compliance
Voluntary tax compliance measured by an instrument developed from [2] which con-
sists of 10 question items that measure voluntary self-registration, refuse to register not
according to procedures, pay taxes without coercion, awareness of paying taxes for the
future period, feel paid tax is an obligation that should, understand taxation regulations,
pay taxes with self-awareness, desire to contribute to the country and others.
3.2.2. Procedural justice
Procedural justice measured by instruments from [24, 26] with 5 items of questions that
measure the same treatment with other taxpayers, correct errors in existing procedures,
can give opinions in the tax authorities, sanctions have been given according to proce-
dures, procedures are in accordance with moral ethics
3.2.3. Tax sanction
Sanctions consist of four questions that measure themagnitude of sanctions, namely the
amount of criminal sanctions, administration, sanctions as a tool for education, sanctions
without tolerance.
3.2.4. Trust in government authorities
Trust in ttax authority measured by the instrument from [23] consisting of 5 items of
questions that measure trust in government transparency, fairness in fulfilling obliga-
tions, equal rights of citizens, ability to manage taxes, have high integrity, act on the
interests of citizens.
3.2.5. Moral norms
Moral norms are individual norms that are owned by a taxpayer, but may not be owned
by other taxpayers. The instrument consists of 5 statement items that measure attitudes
to the obligation to pay taxes, crimes if not paying taxes, not paying taxes is an act that is
not good, the obligation to pay taxes even though it is unfair, paying taxes is an obligation
to help the country.
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All variables are measured using a 5-point Likert scale, point 1 = strongly disagree up
to 5 = strongly agree.
4. Result
4.1. Descriptive statistics
From the 120 questionnaires distributed, 100 questionnaires could be accepted for data
analysis. Table I show the descriptive data:
Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
Procedural justice (KP) 100 15.00 23.00 18.4300 1.61592
Trust in Authority (KC) 100 16.00 30.00 22.7100 3.47660
Moral Norm (NM) 100 12.00 25.00 18.5200 2.12479
Tax Sanction (SP) 100 8.00 20.00 14.4600 1.94583
Voluntary Compliance
(KS)
100 21.00 44.00 37.1600 3.29591
The data shows that the standard deviation is much smaller than the mean which
reflects the representative data.
The hypothesis testing of the research was carried out by using the Structural Equa-
tion Model (SEM) approach by using the Partial Least Square (PLS) software. The results
of the analysis can be explain as follows:
4.2. Result of outer model
4.2.1. Result of common method Bias
The result of common method biased by looking at the full collinearity VIF value of each
variable can be seen in table II
Table 2: Full Collinearity Vifs.
KP SP KC NM KS
1.085 1.056 1.118 1.035 1.015
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In table 2 above can be seen the full collinearity VIF value of all constructs (first Order
Construct) has the value of ”Full Collinearity. VIF below 3.3. It can be concluded that it is
free from collinearity or biased common method.
4.2.2. Result of test validity
Convergent validity is used to measure the same construct. Convergence is shown by
high correlation. Test results of convergent validity can be seen in the table below:
Table 3: Result Of Test Validity.
KP SP KC NM KS Type (a SE P value
KP3 (0.754) -0.091 0.196 0.119 -0.053 Reflective 0.082 <0.001
KP4 (0.754) 0.091 -0.196 -0.119 0.053 Reflective 0.082 <0.001
SP1 0.107 (0.863) 0.010 0.055 -0.013 Reflective 0.079 <0.001
SP3 0.033 (0.708) -0.016 0.055 -0.015 Reflective 0.083 <0.001
SP4 -0.161 (0.724) 0.003 -0.119 0.030 Reflective 0.082 <0.001
KC4 -0.155 -0.047 (0.709) -0.102 0.075 Reflective 0.083 <0.001
KC5 -0.007 0.073 (0.706) -0.040 -0.090 Reflective 0.083 <0.001
KC7 0.154 -0.025 (0.747) 0.134 0.014 Reflective 0.082 <0.001
NM3 -0.036 -0.133 0.004 (0.792) -0.179 Reflective 0.081 <0.001
NM5 0.036 0.133 -0.004 (0.792) 0.179 Reflective 0.081 <0.001
KS2 0.126 -0.069 -0.071 -0.031 (0.831) Reflective 0.080 <0.001
KS3 -0.126 0.069 0.071 0.031 (0.831) Reflective 0.080 <0.001
The result of convergent validity analysis shows that all indicators have a loading value
above 0.5 which means that all indicators are valid.
4.2.3. Result of discriminant validity
To see the results of the discriminant validity test by comparing the value of the cor-
relation indicators in the construct with other variables, the correlation can be seen in
the cross loading value in table 3 above. Discriminant validity can also be seen from the
square root value AVE in the table 4 below
We can be seen from the square root value AVE greater than the correlation between
latent construct variables. The square root of AVE procedural justice is 0.754, tax sanc-
tion 0.768, trust 0.721, moral norm 0.792, voluntary compliance 0.831 is greater than the
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Table 4: Ave,Reliability,R Square.
Correlations among l.vs. with sq. rts. of AVEs Reliability R Square
KP SP KC NM KS
KP 0.754 0.069 0.257 -0.113 -0.013 0.725
SP 0.069 0.768 0.188 0.118 0.001 0.811
KC 0.257 0.188 0.721 -0.036 -0.100 0.765 0.106
NM -0.113 0.118 -0.036 0.792 -0.062 0.771 0.067
KS -0.013 0.001 -0.100 -0.062 0.831 0.817 0.067
correlation value between constructs so the above values are said to be good and meet
the requirements of discriminant validity.
4.2.4. Result of test relialbility
Reliability test results can be seen in table IV above. Composite reliability values above
0.7. It can be concluded that all construct variables have high reliability which means that
each construct variable has an average correlation between items in a reliable model
test
4.3. Result of inner model
To predict the existence of causality in SEM-PLS by using Warp PLS 6.0 program. Figure
of Full structural Equation Model is below:
 
Figure 2: Full structural equation model.
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4.3.1. Determination coefficient
R-squared only exists for endogenous variables [27] The results of the R-squared value
can be seen in table IV above
The construct variable trust influenced by procedural justice and tax sanction of 0.106
(10%) moral norms (NM) has R square of 0.067 which means that it is only affected by
procedural justice and tax sanction of 6.7% and voluntary compliance has a R Square
of 0.067 which means it is affected by trust, procedural justice and moral norms are
only 6.7% and the remaining 93.3% are influenced by variables or factors outside this
research model.
4.4. Result of hypothesis
The results of testing hypotheses can be seen in the table below:




KP-KS (H1) 0.156 0.156 Rejected
KP-KC (H2) 0.264 0.003 Accepted
KC-KS (H3) 0.091 0.091 Rejected
KP-NM (H4) -0.211 0.014 Accepted
NM-KS (H5) -0.215 0.013 Accepted
SP-KC (H6) 0.182 0.030 Accepted
SP-NM (H7) 0.057 0.057 Rejected
Table 5 shows the results of the testing of hypothesis1 is the effect of procedural
justice on voluntary compliance has not significant (p= 0.156> 0.05). The results of
testing of hypothesis 2 shows p value = 0.003 is smaller than the critical value 0.05which
means that hypothesis 2 is accepted. The results of testing of hypothesis 3 shows p
value= 0.091.0.050.05, which means that hypothesis 3 is rejected, The results of testing
hypothesis 4 shows the influence of procedural justice on moral norms has a p value =
0.014 smaller than critical value 0.05, which means that hypothesis 4 is accepted. The
results of testing hypothesis 5 shows that effect moral norms on voluntary compliance
has a p value = 0.013 smaller than critical value 0.05 which means that hypothesis 5 is
accepted. The results of testing hypothesis 6 shows the p value = 0.03 < 0.05, which
means that hypothesis 8 is accepted, The results of testing hypothesis 7 shows the p
value = 0.057 > 0.05, which means the hypothesis is rejected.
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Effect of the mediating variable trust on the dependent variable voluntary compli-
ance does not significant with p value = 0.091 >0.05 which means that hypothesis 8 is
rejected. The effect of tax sanctions on trust as mediation variables has a significant
effect with p = 0.03 > 0.05, while the effect of trust on voluntary compliance is not
significant with p value = 0.092 >0.05. Both of these relationships are not significant so
that the hypothesis 9 rejected. The result show that the trust in authorities not mediated
the effect of procedural justice on voluntary compliance.
The results of testing hypothesis 10 shows the effect of procedural justice on moral
norms is significant with p value = 0.014 < 0.05, while the effect of moral norms on
voluntary compliance is also significant with p value =0.013 < 0.05. Both significant
relationships so that the hypothesis 10 accepted. It can be concluded that moral norm
mediates the effect of procedural justice on voluntary compliance. The results of this
study are consistent with the research [1, 20, 32] found a positive impact derived from
strengths and beliefs about tax payments.
The results of testing hypotheses 11 show that the effect of tax sanctions on the
mediating variables of moral norms is not significant with p value = 0.057>0.05, while
the influence of moral norms on voluntary compliance is significant with p value = 0.013
l < 0.05.
5. Discussion
The results of testing of hypothesis showing no significant influence of procedural jus-
tice on voluntary compliance. The results of this study are not consistent with previous
research (Faisal, 2014 and Faizal, 2017) The result shows that procedural justice has
positif significant effect on trust in government authorities. The result consistent with
previous research [17, 18] wich show the higher perceived procedural justice will increase
trust in government authorities. The results shows that trust in the government has no
effect on voluntary compliance. The results show that trust in the government does not
affect the desire of taxpayers to pay taxesThe results of this study are not in consistent
with Schwarzenberger [1, 28].
In this study procedural justice effect has significant effect on moral norms. The
correlation shows a negative value of -0.211. This indicates procedural justice actually
decreases morality. The results of the study support the theory and consistent with
previous studies [2, 29, 30] have succeeded in proving that the procedural justice of tax
authorities has a positive effect on one’s norms.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i14.4341 Page 613
The First ELEHIC
This study shows that moral norms effect on voluntary compliance. Correlation results
show a value of -0.215 which has a negative relationship which indicates that increasing
moral norms actually reduce voluntary compliance. Although this hypothesis is sup-
ported but this negative relationship is different from previous research. Basri and Al
Azhar [31] research shows that increasing morale will reduce unethical behaviors such
as tax fraud.
Tax sanctions has significant effect on trust in government authorities. The higher
sanctions can increase the taxpayer’s morality so that they are aware of their tax obli-
gations. Consistent [4] that sanctions in the form of imposing penalties are perceived as
indicators that tax authorities can increase honest taxpayer trust. The test results show
that tax sanctions do not affect moral norms. The results of this study are not consistent
with Novia (2016) that the existence of sanctions will affect morale.
Mediation testing used partial step method. This study shows trust in authorities can-
not mediate the influence of procedural justice on voluntary compliance. The results of
this study are inconsistent with the research [31] who found trust as a variable that medi-
ates the effect of procedural justice on tax compliance.The results also shows that the
trust in authorities not mediated the effect of procedural justice on voluntary compliance.
This study shows that moral norm mediates the effect of procedural justice on vol-
untary compliance. The results of this study are consistent with the research [1, 20, 32]
found a positive impact derived from strengths and beliefs about tax payments.
The results show that the effect of tax sanctions on the mediating variables of moral
norms is not significant effect. This study does not support the Theory ofmoral reasoning
states that moral decisions aremainly influenced by the application of sanctions and [25]
which states sanctions will increase moral obligations
6. Conclusions
The results show that there is no significant influence of procedural justice on volun-
tary compliance. Procedural justice has a significant influence on trust in government
authorities. The higher perceived procedural justice will increase trust in government
authorities. In this study, trust in the government does not affect voluntary compliance,
but procedural justice affects moral norms. Moral norms affect voluntary compliance.
The results show that the higher moral norms actually reduce voluntary tax compliance.
Tax sanctions affect trust in government authorities. The higher sanctions can increase
the taxpayer’s morality so they are aware of their tax obligations. The results of the
study show that tax sanctions have no effect on moral norms, meaning that trust cannot
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mediate the influence of procedural justice on voluntary compliance. trust does not
mediate the influence of procedural justice on voluntary compliance trust does not medi-
ate mediating the influence of procedural justice on voluntary compliance. The results
show that Normal mediates the influence of procedural justice on voluntary compliance,
but moral norms do not mediate tax sanctions with voluntary tax compliance.
7. Limitations
This research is only carried out on individual taxpayers who have aMSMEbusiness only.
The study area was only conducted in the areas of Pekanbaru, Kampar and Bengkalis so
that these results cannot be generalized more broadly. Deterrence and social variables
are still few and have not shown a large influence on voluntary compliance. The research
model only uses mediation of moral norms and trust in government authorities
8. Suggested for Future Research
Further research should expand the object of research not only on individual taxpayers
but also corporate taxpayers. Further research can expand the research area so that
research results can be more generalized. Subsequent research can examine deter-
rence and social variables other factors social norms, economic levels, law enforcement,
examination, politics etc. Research can further develop the model by adding other vari-
ables to obtain the best model in voluntary compliance
9. Implications
This study has a contribution to the theory that supports that procedural justice influ-
ences trust and moral norms, as well as tax sanctions also affect procedural justice and
moral norms. Moral norms are intermediaries for the creation of voluntary compliance.
It is important for the government to increase the taxpayer’s morality so as to increase
voluntary compliance.
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